













This study advances the understanding of the housing-fertility relationship in Australia by 
examining whether childbearing is associated with residential mobility. We also investigate 
spatial polarisation by classifying moves into either disadvantaged or advantaged 
neighbourhoods. Furthermore, the statistical tool used departs from the conventional modelling 
approach in the residential mobility literature by accounting for the unobserved intra-household 
bargaining process that transpires when household members make a decision to relocate. Results 
suggest that couple households are significantly more likely to move residence with pregnancy 
and birth of a child but are less likely to move as children become older. In contrast, single 
parents are less likely to move residence with pregnancy and birth. Couples expecting or 
following the birth of a child are significantly more likely to move into non-disadvantaged 
neighbourhood, while single parent households are less likely to move into a non-disadvantaged 
neighbourhood. We also find empirical evidence that the decision to move by an individual when 
he/she is single is likely to be differentially influenced by a partner when they are subsequently 
living in a couple household. The results were based from multilevel models estimated using the 
longitudinal data of the Household Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) survey 
collected annually from 2001 to 2010. 
 
Keywords: residential mobility; childbearing; spatial-polarisation; intra-household bargaining; 
multilevel model; Australia 
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1. Introduction  
Residential mobility is often linked with life course events such as leaving the parental home, 
union formation or family dissolution, the birth of children and seizing employment 
opportunities (Dewilde 2008; Clark and Huang 2003). For instance, young adults moving out 
of the parental home often start their housing careers in the form of shared accommodation. 
As they enter cohabiting relationships, they can typically afford to rent an apartment as a 
couple while they save for a probable house mortgage in the future. Couples and single 
parents upgrade housing status as they form families. Following retirement age, older people 
may decide to move into smaller houses or into care accommodation as the need arises 
(Tatsiramos 2006).  
There is a growing body of research on the effects of childbearing on housing outcomes. For 
instance, with the expected birth of children, couples may plan to undertake a residential 
move to increase the number of bedrooms and space in their home or to move into 
neighbourhoods that improve the quality of the child’s development experience and schools 
(Rosenberg, Jarus, Bart and Ratzon 2010; Evans, Lyscha and Marcynyszyn 2004; Bradley 
and Corwyn 2002). In some countries like Britain, the probability of a local move is highest 
when the youngest child is of preschool age, but decreases with the age of the youngest child 
and the number of children (Böheim and Taylor 2002).  In contrast, there is evidence that 
long-distance moves are restricted by the presence and age of children ((Belot and Ermisch 
2009; Sandefur and Scott 1981), which might be explained by higher economic costs of 
relocation and concerns about disruption of children’s schooling and social networks.   
Previous research has also revealed that the presence of children is negatively associated with 
the probability of migration from a smaller to a larger settlement (Kulu 2005; Kulu 2008).    
Despite the body of knowledge that has been accumulated, how childbearing affects a 
household’s residential mobility propensity remains an empirical issue in Australia due to 
limited availability of longitudinal social data in the past (Spallek and Haynes 2014). 
Nevertheless, the country provides an interesting case study for understanding when and 
where families move after child birth or in the presence of children because relative to other 
developed countries, Australians are among the most mobile wherein about 45% of its 
population moved residence at least once over the past decade
1
.  
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  Based on authors’ computations using HILDA data.  
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In this study, we advance the existing literature about the relationship between residential 
mobility and childbearing in three ways. First, using a detailed set of childbearing outcomes 
such as pregnancy, birth and age of children, we examine whether childbearing influences an 
individual’s propensity to move. Second, we incorporate spatial polarisation in the analysis 
by distinguishing moves into disadvantaged or advantaged neighbourhoods. Third, we also 
depart from conventional mobility models by accounting for the unobserved intra-household 
bargaining process that transpires when a household makes a decision to relocate by adopting 
the modelling framework proposed recently by Steele, Clarke and Washbrook (2013). Our 
analyses of the HILDA panel data leads to several interesting findings. First, we find 
empirical evidence that having older children is negatively associated with residential 
mobility. Second, birth and pregnancy are negatively correlated with the propensity to move 
among single parents while the opposite is true for couples. The results also confirm the 
persistence of spatial polarisation (of disadvantage). In particular, relative to not moving, the 
risk of moving into a disadvantaged neighbourhood is almost two times greater than for 
households that are already living in a disadvantaged neighbourhood. This suggests that 
spatial polarisation of disadvantage in Australia is an issue that needs to be addressed. 
Furthermore, we also find empirical support that the decision to move by an individual when 
they are single is likely to be differentially influenced by a partner when they are 
subsequently living in a couple household.   
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the 
overarching theoretical framework for the succeeding analyses. Section 3 discusses how we 
implement the theoretical framework on empirical data by estimating statistical models that 
allow us to understand the association between childbearing and the propensity to move into 
an advantaged or disadvantaged neighbourhood. Section 4 summarizes the empirical results 
and provides broad policy implications. The last section presents concluding remarks by 
outlining recommendations for future research work.  
 
2. Theoretical Framework for Examining the Relationship between Residential 
Mobility and Childbearing 
Comparative estimates show that Australians are among the most mobile among the 
industrialized countries (Bell and Hugo 2000). In particular, about two in five Australian 
households moved at least once every five years until the 1980s (Long 1992) while recent 
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evidence suggests that about 45% of the Australian population moved residence at least once 
between 2000 and 2010
2
. While some argue that this can be partly attributed to the structural 
affordability problem of housing in Australia over the past half century (Yates 2007), 
residential mobility, in general, often occurs as a result of disequilibrium between current 
housing status and changing housing needs (Hanushek and Quigley 1978). These housing 
needs are shaped by changes accompanying life course events such that it leads to residential 
mobility if the new needs are not met by one’s current housing status (Wilkens, Warren, 
Hahn and Houng 2010).  
More formally, the decision to move could be examined under the conventional utility-
maximization framework in economics.  In particular, a household would compare the utility 
associated with staying at its current residential location with the expected utility that will be 
received when relocating (Greenwood 1997). For instance, consider a typical household h 
with a well-behaved utility function denoted by (1) where Chl refers to a latent measure that 
gauges the overall qualities of the l
th
 location and Phl is the amount of resources needed to be 
able to avail of those spatial qualities. The maximization problem reduces to identifying the 
location l which gives the highest value for utility. 
 
                        𝑈𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦ℎ = 𝑓(𝐶ℎ𝑚, 𝑃ℎ𝑚)𝐼𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑦 + ∑ 𝑓(𝐶ℎ𝑙𝑙≠𝑚 , 𝑃ℎ𝑙)𝐼𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒                            (1) 
 
subject to a budget constraint: 
 
                                                    Chl*Phl ≤ Rh                                                                 (2) 
 
where Rh is the total resources available to the household 
Residential mobility studies are usually interested on identifying the life events that influence 
a person’s propensity to move. Childbearing is regarded as one of the key milestones in an 
individual’s life course which is closely related with residential mobility, and hence, affects 
Chl (Kulu 2008). There are several mechanisms in which childbearing may affect the 
propensity to move. For instance, childbearing families will strive harder to live in a 
neighbourhood of higher quality because family living arrangements and physical 
environment influence children’s long-term development (Maguire, Edwards and Soloff 
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  Based on authors’ estimates using ten waves of HILDA. 
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2011; Rosenberg et al. 2010; Crampton and Freisthler 2009; Hornberg and Pauli 2007; 
Evans, et al. 2004; Bradley and Corwyn 2002). For some, the birth of a child marks the best 
time to carry out the long-planned move for a better housing and neighbourhood experience 
(Lindgren 2003). In Australia, households with children aged one to four years exhibit higher 
residential mobility rates than households with older children to avoid the risk factors on 
child’s development associated with inferior housing conditions and neighbourhood quality 
(Council of Australian Governments (COAG) 2009; Evans 2006; Bell and Hugo 2000). This 
episode typically occurs by the adult age of 30 to 40 years when child-rearing becomes one of 
the priorities of Australians (Hassan, Zang and McDonnell-Baum 1996). However, as family 
size increases and children grow older, the social and financial cost of relocating also 
increases. Thus, older households tend to seek a more stable housing career (Adrienko 2010; 
Hassan, et al. 1996). The decision to undertake a residential move may therefore be 
associated with the expected birth, presence and age of children. This pattern is observed in 
other developed countries including the US and UK (Böheim and Taylor 2002; Ermisch and 
DiSalvo 1996). 
Given that housing is one of the fundamental pillars of how socio-economic advantage 
proliferate across generations (Beer, Faulkner, Paris and Clower 2011), it is important to 
understand what affects mobility into disadvantaged or advantaged neighbourhood. Although 
residential mobility is a mechanism used to address unmet housing needs, in general, it does 
not always represent an improvement in one’s housing career. In some cases, childbearing 
may entail trading-off between the quality of the neighbourhood with the other needs of the 
children. For example, Bell and Hugo (2000) argued that higher rates of residential mobility 
among childbearing families could also be associated with higher poverty and unemployment 
rates particularly among single-parents. In other words, it is possible that a significant 
proportion of the mobile childbearing households are moving into disadvantaged 
neighbourhoods. Worryingly, the suboptimal conditions
3
 in disadvantaged areas may have 
profound long-term effect on a child’s socio-economic opportunities in the future which in 
turn, may trap these families further in disadvantaged areas (Ware, Gronda and Vitis 2010; 
COAG 2009; Berube 2005; Evans 2004, Bradley and Corwyn 2002).  
                                                          
3
  Examples of suboptimal conditions include the limited private sector activity in disadvantaged locations 
which in turn raise prices for the “poor”, limited job networks because of high prevalence of unemployment, 
higher prevalence of crime and social disorder, among others (Ware, Gronda and Vitis 2010).  
5 
 
Another key issue that has not been given adequate attention in most of the existing 
residential mobility studies until recently is that the decision to move could be made by 
multiple decision makers within a household. In other words, most of the previous studies 
have implicitly assumed that within the household h, the Chl depicted in (1) and (2) is fixed 
across all decision-makers. However, more recent evidence suggest that this is not necessarily 
the case. For instance, Coulter, van Ham and Feijten (2011) found that while the propensity 
of a residential move among couples in the United Kingdom interacts with each partner’s 
desire, women tend to have a stronger influence over that decision. To reflect that the 
decision to move is made collectively by multiple decision makers within a household, 
Steele, et al. (2013) implicitly expressed Chl as a weighted function of the Ch(i)l’s, where Ch(i)l 
corresponds to how the i
th
 decision maker in household h values the characteristic of location 
l. As will be shown later, this is done by expressing the random effect of a multiple member-
household’s decision to move as a weighted sum of each decision maker’s propensity to 
move. Thus, for a household with M decision makers,  
 
                                                             𝐶ℎ𝑙 = ∑ 𝑤ℎ(𝑖)𝐶ℎ(𝑖)𝑙
𝑀
𝑖=1                                             (3) 
 
where wh(i) is proportional to the intra-household bargaining power of the i
th
 decision-maker 
in  household h. In this setting, household h will decide to move if (4) holds or will stay in its 
current location if (5) holds.  
                                                       argmax𝑙(𝑈𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦) = 𝑛, 𝑛 ≠ 𝑚                                      (4) 
 
                                                             argmax𝑙(𝑈𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦) = 𝑚                                            (5) 
 
In Australia, despite the leaps achieved in understanding spatial disadvantage and its policy 
implications since the 1970s (Pawson, Davison and Wiesel 2012, Yates and Wood 2005; 
Lilley 2005; Kendig 1979; Manning 1976), there is still marginal knowledge on how the 
intra-household bargaining process interplay with the propensity among low-income 
childbearing households to move into disadvantaged locations and how it contributes to a 
cycle of socio-economic exclusion in the country (Wulff and Reynolds 2010; Randolph & 
Holloway 2005). This study aims to shed light on this empirical issue and advance our 
understanding of the housing-fertility relationship by examining the effects of a detailed set 
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of childbearing outcomes such as number and age of children and pregnancy on the 
propensity to move into or away from disadvantaged neighbourhoods.  
 
3. Model Specification and Data 
3.1    Statistical Models of Residential Mobility 
In theory, the decision to relocate portrays an intra-household bargaining process whose 
members may have conflicting preferences. Putting this into context, it is intuitive to employ 
households as analytical units in a statistical analysis to directly capture the unobserved 
within-household bargaining component of the decision-making process. However, choosing 
to employ households as analytical units is accompanied by the issue of how to capture the 
changes in household composition. The absence of a constant household identifier that 
properly reflects the changes in household composition over time in many existing 
longitudinal data collection systems makes it hard to implement. Thus, it is not surprising to 
find that previous studies (for example, Pickles and Davies, 1985; Murphy, 1996) tended to 
ignore the issue of changes in household composition. To address this issue, Steele, et al. 
(2013) proposed two ways of modelling the probability of a residential move using either the 
head of household (HoH) approach or the multiple membership (MM) approach. Both 
approaches provide a way around the issue of whether to use individuals or households as 
analytical units while accounting for the unobserved intra-household bargaining process 
when making a decision to move. To discuss the analytical framework for modelling the 
relationship between residential mobility and different childbearing outcomes, we review the 
statistical approach proposed by Steele, et al. (2013) in this section. In particular, consider the 
general model: 
 
                                          log (
𝑝𝑖𝑡
1−𝑝𝑖𝑡
) = 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                  (6) 
 
where pit is the probability of a residential move between wave t and t+1 , Xit is the vector of 
covariates including the different fertility outcomes and other control factors, is the vector 
of covariate effects, ui is the unobserved individual random effect while  is the random 
disturbance term. Previous research on residential mobility provides strong arguments to 
model residential mobility of households with one decision maker, and households with 
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multiple decision makers, as different processes (Steele, et al. 2013; Black, Kalb and 
Kostenko 2009). Therefore we modify equation (6) such that  
 
       log (
𝑝𝑖𝑡
1−𝑝𝑖𝑡
) = 𝐼{𝑖 𝑖𝑠 𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒𝑡}[𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝑢𝑖
𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒] + 𝐼{𝑖 𝑖𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑡}[𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛼 + 𝑢𝑖
𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑙𝑒] + 𝜀𝑖𝑡     (7)                               
 
where I is an indicator variable that identifies single and couple households for individual i at 
wave t, and u(i, single) is the unobserved individual random effect for individual i when residing 
in a household as single, and u(i, couple)  is the unobserved but possibly different random effect 
for the same individual i when residing in a couple household. As in Steele, et al. (2013), we 
treat all moves due to union formulation and dissolution as right censored so that these 
processes will not mask the individual mobility preferences implied in the models’ random 
effects. All residential moves are considered as joint moves and so it is sufficient to estimate 
only one pit for each household. Nevertheless, all decision makers are still allowed to 
contribute in the estimation of the random part of (7).  
 
Head of Household Model (HoH) 
The HoH approach basically combines the conventional methods of household- and 
individual-based approaches in residential mobility analysis as described earlier. As in the 
household-based approach, the covariates include both observed household and household 
members’ characteristics. However, the unobserved household effect will depend on the 
individual identifier of the head of the household
4
. The approach has some limitations in 
capturing changes in household composition.  
Variations of the model described in equation (7) will arise from different possible 
correlation structures between the random effects associated with a decision to move made by 






iu , respectively. The 





the same as 
couple
iju . Following Steel et al. (2011) we refer to this as the HoH common model.  
                                                          
4
  Following the convention in the Cross National Equivalent File, the household head is defined as the male 
parent in a couple, single parent or lone person (Freidin 2010).  For same sex unions, the older partner is 
identified as the household head.  
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Implicitly, the HoH common model implies that conditional on the observed covariates, the 
unobserved heterogeneity on the propensity to move residence among singles is the same as 
that of couples. This assumption will often be unrealistic and is relaxed in the more flexible 
HoH joint model which allows the unobserved heterogeneity in the decision to move house to 
vary according to whether an individual resides in a single or couple household i.e. the HoH 






iu  to be correlated. The HoH joint model contains three 
random effect parameters, allowing the between-individual and between-couple variances 
and the single-couple covariance to be freely estimated. The model is 
 
      log (
𝑝𝑖𝑡
1−𝑝𝑖𝑡
) = 𝐼{𝑖 𝑖𝑠 𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒𝑡}[𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝑢𝑖
𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒] + 𝐼{𝑖 𝑖𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑡}[𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛼 + 𝑢𝑖








2 )                (9) 
 
Multiple Membership Model (MM) 
An alternative to the HoH approach is to specify the unobserved random effect of couples as 
a weighted sum of the random effects of each partner. This is analogous to the multiple 
membership models commonly described in the class of multilevel models (Browne, 
Goldstein, Rasbash 2001; Goldstein, Rasbash, Browne, Woodhouse and Poulain 2000). In the 
MM model, we express 
couple
iju  as a weighted sum of iu and ju . This way, unlike the HoH 
approach, the MM approach directly captures the changes in household composition. In 
addition, the household random effect is not biased towards the random effect of household 
heads. For example, when two single individuals i and j enter co-residential unions, the 
household formed would be assigned a random effect jjii
couple
ij uwuwu  . When individuals 
i and j separate and individual i enter a new co-residential union with individual k, the 
household formed will be assigned a random effect kkii
couple
ik uwuwu   while individual j 
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would keep the value of uj.  Since the MM model has fewer parameters than HoH model, it is 
expected to provide greater computational efficiency
5
.  
The additivity of the random effects is consistent with the notion that housing decision-
makers with conflicting preferences will bargain to reach a consensus (Steele, et al. 2013). In 
addition, the use of weights wi and wj provides a way of assigning varying levels of 
importance to each decision maker. Imposing the constraint wi + wj = 1 entails assuming that 
couples are always less heterogeneous than singles in terms of the unobserved propensity to 
move.  This is consistent with the intra-household bargaining argument wherein once the 
decision to move has been made, couples will move together. While the choice of weights wi 
and wj is somewhat arbitrary (Browne, Goldstein and Rasbash 2001), we will consider the 
case where partners have equal contribution to the unobserved propensity to move. . 
Following Steele, et al. (2013) we specify wi = wj = 0.5 in the MM-consensus model.  
Theoretically, we can extend the HoH and MM models to accommodate multinomial 
outcomes.  We do so only for the HoH model in this research. In addition to modeling the 
binary outcome of moving residence or not, this study will also estimate multinomial models 
of the propensity to move into disadvantaged locations or into non-disadvantaged 






0) = 𝐼{𝑖 𝑖𝑠 𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒𝑡}[𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝑢𝑖




      (10)  
 𝑢𝑖
𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒 = 𝑢𝑖   𝑢𝑖(𝑗)
𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑙𝑒 = 0.5𝑢𝑖 + 0.5𝑢𝑗    𝑢𝑖 ~ 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑢
2)                                                    (11)                                   
 
where p = 1, 2 and 
0
itp  denotes the probability of staying in the same residence between time 
t and t+1, 
1
itp  denotes the probability of moving into a disadvantaged location while 
2
itp  
denotes the probability of moving into non-disadvantaged location.  
For the HoH joint model in the multinomial form, we allow all random effects to covary as in 
equation (9):  
                                                          
5
  Unlike the HoH model, MM model does not have a separate parameter for the between-couple variance. In 
other words, the residual component of the MM model only contains individual-specific random effects. 
Nevertheless, it is straightforward to compute the variance of the between-couple random effect and its 
covariance with the between-individual random effect based from the model formulation (Steele, et al. 2013).  
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𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑙𝑒,𝑝=2)~ 𝑀𝑉𝑁(0, 𝛴𝑢𝑝)            (12) 
 















                    (13) 
  
To provide a point of comparison, we will also estimate simple logistic and simple 
multinomial models. The model parameters will be estimated simultaneously using Markov 
Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulation (Gelman, Carlin, Stern and Rubin 2005) which is 
implemented using the MLwiN macro for Stata. For the logistic models, the parameter 
estimates from second order penalized quasi-likelihood (PQL2) approach are used as initial 
starting values for each of the regression parameters.  For the multinomial logistic models, we 
use the results from first order marginal quasi-likelihood (MQL1) as starting values.  
 
3.2     Data 
To address our research questions, we use the data from ten waves of the Household, Income 
and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) panel survey collected annually in Australia 
from 2001. The HILDA survey tracks information on a range of socio-economic indicators 
such as family dynamics, education and employment history, income and wealth, among 
others. The first wave was carried out in 2001 from a sample of 19,914 individuals from 
7,682 households. Succeeding waves tracked the original sampled household members.  Data 
about new household entrants are also tracked in succeeding waves as long as they reside 
with a permanent sample member. Summerfield, et al. (2011) provides a detailed discussion 
on the tracking rules employed in data collection for the first ten waves of HILDA.  The 
attrition rate for the survey has fallen from 13.2% in wave 2 to 3.7% in wave 10. 
Furthermore, about 70% of those who were interviewed in the first wave were also re-
interviewed in the tenth wave and there are 7,460 individuals who were interviewed in all ten 
waves (MIAESR 2011). The longitudinal data from HILDA is suitable for analyzing the 
interrelationships between residential mobility, fertility and neighbourhood advantage in 
Australia with the following relevant questions: 
(a) ...have you changed address since last interview? 
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(b) …when did you move (in current residence) here? 
(c) …do you (or any household member) own this home, rent it or live here rent-free? 
(d) …how many children do you have? 
(e) …has there been a pregnancy since last interview? 
(f) …has there been a birth since last interview? 
The survey data can also be merged with the 2001 Socio-economic Indexes for Areas 
(SEIFA) compiled by ABS. 
To model residential mobility, we restrict the analysis to adults aged 18-75
6
 who appear in at 
least two consecutive waves. There are 15,626 individuals from 11,748 “household” 
decision-making units in the data used for succeeding analyses
7
.  Of the 15,626 individuals, 
28.0% were always single, 53.1% were always partnered, and 18.9% were observed both as 
single and with a partner. A list of variables used in subsequent analyses is provided below 
while Tables 1 and 2 present a descriptive summary of the profile of our sample. Appendix 1 
also provides other descriptive statistics.      
We are interested in examining two types of outcomes. The first response variable is a binary 
indicator that assumes a value of 0 if an individual did not move residence between waves t 
and t+1 and 1 if the individual relocated. As moves due to union formation and dissolution 
are treated as right censored, the response outcome assumes a value of zero when the 
residential move was accompanied by union formation or dissolution. Given this definition of 
residential move, the proportion of (pooled) sample that moved between consecutive waves t 
and t + 1 is 17.8% among singles and 11.9% among couples. The proportion of individuals 
who did not move is 55.1%, 24.0% moved once, 11.5% moved twice, 5.3% moved thrice and 
4.1% moved at least four times between 2000 and 2010.  
The second response variable is a categorical indicator that assumes a value of 0 if an 
individual did not move residence between waves t and t+1, 1 if the individual moved into a 
disadvantaged neighbourhood and 2 if an individual moved into a non-disadvantaged 
                                                          
6
  We include individuals between the age of 15 to 17 if they are living independently with or without a partner. 
This excludes dependent students. 
7
  A household decision-making unit refers to co-resident adults who make decisions together.  A household 
with a single adult living with his/her parents has two decision-making units. This definition of decision-making 
unit is analogous to the concept of income unit adopted in HILDA. Of the 15,626 individuals considered in 




location. Data from the Socio-economic Indexes for Areas (SEIFA) is used to identify a 
disadvantaged neighbourhood. SEIFA is an index of social advantage and disadvantage 
whereby low scores represent lower social and human capital within the area. Factors like 
income, educational background, unemployment rates, and number of bedrooms per person 
are used to construct the index through principal component analysis. We choose to use 
SEIFA 2001 throughout the ten waves of HILDA instead of using both SEIFA 2001 and 
2006 because we believe that SEIFA would be quite stable over time. This is consistent with 
the findings of Black, Kalb and Kostenko (2009). Specifically, neighbourhoods with the 
lowest 20% SEIFA scores are identified as disadvantaged areas. Given this definition, the 
proportion of sample relocating into disadvantaged neighbourhoods is 4.0% among singles 
and 2.1% among couples. In other words, we estimate that about 22.4% of the moves among 
singles and 17.4% of the moves among couples can be characterized as moves into 
disadvantaged neighbourhoods. The proportion of sample moving into non-disadvantaged 
neighbourhoods is 13.9% among singles and 9.2% among couples.  
To examine the relationship between a residential move and fertility outcomes we include the 
following time varying covariates: number of dependent children (less than 15 years old) 
during wave t, age of youngest child during wave t, pregnancy and both first and higher-order 
births between waves t and t+1. Previous research has identified other variables that are 
important factors associated with residential mobility and these are included in the model as 
control variables. 
We control for current tenure status by including a binary variable that assumes a value of 0 
if an individual owns a house or has a life tenure in his/her residence at wave t, 1 if  an 
individual is renting during wave t. We also include dummy variables corresponding to the 
number of years that an individual has been staying at his/her residence at wave t. For 
couples at time t, we control for cohabiting status, whether legally married or cohabiting. We 
also control for household’s (equivalised) disposable income at time t and whether the person 
received any form of government assistance. Education profile of an individual is controlled 
for by including a dummy variable that assumes a value of 1 if an individual has at least a 
bachelor’s degree during wave t and 0 otherwise. For couples, we identify whether one, both 
or no partners have a university bachelor degree. We control for employment status by 
including a dummy variable to indicate whether an individual is employed or not. For 
couples, we identify whether both partners, only one partner or neither are employed. To 
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control for the size of house we include a covariate for the number of bedrooms per family 
member and we include covariates for current housing and neighbourhood satisfaction
8
. 
We control for fixed location effects by including dummy variables for each State and a 
series of dummy variables providing information about the remoteness of a household’s 
residence at wave t, and whether the household is currently living in a disadvantaged area 
using the SEIFA index. We also control for other important socio-demographic 
characteristics by including variables such as age and sex (of household head).  
The first few columns of Table 1 show the systematic differences and similarities between the 
profile of non-movers from disadvantaged and non-disadvantaged neighbourhoods.  Not 
surprisingly, non-movers from non-disadvantaged areas have higher social capital in terms of 
education, employment and income. The majority of non-movers, regardless of whether they 
reside in disadvantaged neighbourhoods, are home owners, although the proportion of non-
movers who are home owners is significantly higher among those living in non-
disadvantaged areas. Interestingly, non-movers from disadvantaged locations are almost as 
satisfied with their current housing and neighbourhood quality as non-movers from non-
disadvantaged areas both with median satisfaction score of 8.  
The last four columns of Table 1 describe the profile of movers and the direction of change 
with respect to the quality of neighbourhood. Systematic differences in human capital, 
financial resources, location and housing career satisfaction emerge when we compare 
movers who relocated to another disadvantaged neighbourhood with movers who relocated to 
another non-disadvantaged area. In terms of fertility and childbearing, we find that single 
parents who relocated to another disadvantaged neighbourhood are more likely to be rearing 




4. Empirical Estimation and Results 
All models are estimated using Monte Carlo Markov Chain (MCMC) simulations in a 
Bayesian framework. Non-informative priors were specified for all parameters in the models 
and starting values were obtained using the iterative generalized least squares method of 
                                                          
8
  Satisfaction scores range from 0 to 1, 1 indicating highest satisfaction.  
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estimation. We ran the Metropolis Hastings sampler for 50,000 iterations with the first 10,000 
iterations discarded as burn-in.  For the multinomial logistic models, we reduced the number 
of MCMC iterations to 5000 to speed up the computational process. Diagnostics for the 
MCMC simulations produced smooth kernel densities for the posterior distributions of the 
variances in all models. We find that the fixed effects results from the HoH and MM models 
are similar but there are differences in the random effects results.  
 
4.1    Covariate Effects in Logistic Models of Residential Mobility 
Figure 1 and Table 2 summarize the covariate effects on the log-odds of a residential move 
between waves.  Figure 1 shows negative duration effects on the likelihood of a move with 
individuals becoming less likely to move the longer they remain in the same residence 
(Figure 1). This is consistent with the “inertia effect” found by Steele, et al. (2013) in the UK. 
Living in the same house for longer periods of time may entail higher transaction costs of 
moving leading to a reduced probability of relocating. Interestingly, singles tend to have 
stronger duration effects than couples.  
 
FIGURE 1 & TABLE 2 
 
Table 2 shows the effects of other covariates for individuals living in single adult households 
and couple households. Here, we find that homeowners are less likely to relocate than renters. 
This may be linked to the higher cost spent by homeowners in acquiring the property and 
thus, they are more likely tied to their current residence. Interestingly, renting couples have a 
stronger propensity to move than renting singles. This may be associated with the need to 
upgrade housing with the likely event of a birth and as children become older in a couple 
household.  
Among singles, women are more likely to move than men. Age exhibits a concave 
relationship with the propensity of moving residence. Younger adults are more likely to 
change residence than middle-aged individuals. More specifically, younger adults who are 
renting have significantly higher mobility propensities than middle-aged individuals who 
already own a house. Although residential mobility propensities taper off during an 
individual’s midlife stage, it gradually increases again as a person enters the senior years. 
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This is consistent with the findings from other industrialized economies where older 
households tend to move from house ownership into renting (Tatsiramos 2006).  
Having less than one (bed)room per person is positively correlated with higher propensity of 
residential moves. On the other hand, having too many (bed)room per person is also 
positively correlated with higher probability of moving especially among singles. This is 
probably because maintaining a large house creates additional financial stress. Intuitively, 
greater satisfaction towards current residence is negatively associated with probability of 
moving residence.  
Our estimated models also reflect interstate variation in mobility rates. Among couples, 
Queenslanders are the most mobile. On the other hand, from the multinomial logistic models, 
moving propensities to disadvantaged neighbourhood are highest in New South Wales, South 
Australia, Queensland and Tasmania. Furthermore, living in urban cities or rural villages is 
also correlated with the propensity to move. In particular, individuals living in remote areas 
of Australia are more likely to move compared to those who are living in major cities.The 
logistic models also suggest that higher levels of skills as proxied by better educational 
attainment increase the returns of migration as they open up more employment opportunities 
(Greenwood 1997). Furthermore, we also find that higher income is associated with an 
increase in the likelihood of moving.  
After controlling for the important factors discussed above, we find mixed results in the 
effects of the presence and age of children on mobility rates. This is similar with the findings 
from Steele, et al.’s (2013) study where they concluded that the effects of presence and age of 
children on mobility rates are less consistent in UK. In particular, we find that among singles, 
pregnancy and first birth are negatively correlated with the propensity to move. On the other 
hand, couples’ residential moves tend to coincide with the birth of first child. In addition, 
couple households are less likely to move as their children get older. 
 
4.2    Covariate Effects in Multinomial Models of Residential Mobility 
Table 3 summarizes the covariate effects on the joint log-odds of moving into disadvantaged 
areas or into non-disadvantaged neighbourhoods relative to no move. While moves into a 
disadvantaged neighbourhood may be perceived as a negative outcome relative to moves into 
a non-disadvantaged neighbourhood, it is not clear whether such a move will lead to a more 
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negative outcome than remaining in the same neighbourhood. Hence, we consider these three 
possibilities as unordered categorical outcomes rather than ordinal outcomes.  
Many of the fixed effect results based on the multinomial models are similar to the findings 
based from the logistic models presented in the previous section. For instance, we also find 
strong duration effects wherein the length of stay in current residence is negatively correlated 
with the propensity to move. In addition, the concave relationship of age persists when we 
consider the propensity to move to both disadvantaged and non-disadvantaged 
neighbourhoods. Nevertheless, there are some additional interesting findings. For instance, 
our model estimates show that the propensity to move is not significantly different for singles 
with or without a university degree but when they do move, single individuals with a 
bachelor’s degree are more likely to move into a non-disadvantaged neighbourhood. Couples 
where both partners have a bachelor’s degree are more likely to move into a non-
disadvantaged neighbourhood but the association is not significant if only one partner has a 
degree. Also, we find mixed results on the relationship between (disposable) income and 
moving propensities. For singles, lower income is significantly associated with the 
probability of moving into disadvantaged neighbourhoods. For couples, the strength of 
relationship between income and mobility propensities is stronger. Furthermore, higher 
income in a couple household is positively associated with moving into a non-disadvantaged 
neighbourhood and negatively associated with moving into disadvantaged neighbourhoods. 
The propensity to move is not associated with employment for either single or couple 
households, but this may be a consequence of the effects of employment and income being 
confounded. Those who received any form of assistance from the government are more likely 
to be moving into disadvantaged neighbourhoods (relative to not moving). This does not 
imply that government assistance increases the propensity to move into disadvantaged 
neighbourhoods.  
Spatial polarisation is quite strong. Living in a disadvantaged neighbourhood increases the 
relative risk of moving into another disadvantaged neighbourhood by approximately 2.1 
times among singles and 2.3 times among couples, while reducing the propensity to move 






In terms of the relationship between childbearing and the propensity to move into a 
disadvantaged or non-disadvantaged neighbourhood, the results show that relative to not 
moving, pregnancy and first birth are negatively correlated with the propensity to move into a 
non-disadvantaged neighbourhood among single households. On the other hand, having older 
children reduces the propensity of couple households to move into non-disadvantaged 
neighbourhoods relative to not moving. In addition, the birth of first child increases the 
propensity to move into non-disadvantaged neighbourhoods among couple households.  
 
4.3     Residual variance 
In residential mobility analysis, failing to account for this variance-covariance structure of the 
unobserved propensity to move among individuals may lead to biased estimates of the 
hypothesized determinants of residential mobility (Steele, et al. 2013; Goldstein 2003). Thus, 
in this study, we allow the random intercepts to vary according to the type of household in 
which an individual currently lives, i.e., whether it is a single or a couple household. 
Estimates of the between-individual and between-couple residual variances are provided in 
Tables 4 and 5. For the logistic models, the estimated variances and covariances are quite 
different across the models that we considered. From the head-of-household models, the 
magnitude of the random effect variance for individuals and couples are approximately equal. 
In other words, after controlling the observable drivers of residential mobility, the propensity 
to change residence among lone-person households is almost the same as that of couples’. On 
the other hand, the multiple-membership consensus model produced a lower random effect 
variance among couples than among individuals. Because we don’t have a separate estimator 
for the between-couple variance, this observation is a direct consequence of the choice of 
weights for each partner’s individual random effect. In contrast, the multiple-membership 
double model produced a higher random effect variance among couples than among 
individuals. Again, this is a direct consequence of how the random effects are specified. From 
the estimates of the multiple membership logistic model, the correlation between the 
unobserved random effects of singles and couples is about 0.7. For the multinomial models, 
the corresponding correlations range from 0.3 to 0.6. Therefore the contribution to the 
unobserved propensity to move differs for an individual when they join a couple household as 








The results are qualitatively similar for the multinomial logistic models. An additional 
interesting feature that we find from the multinomial models is that after accounting for the 
observable drivers of residential mobility, the variation in the unobserved propensity to 
disadvantaged households among couples is significantly lower than the other random effect 
variances under the HoH joint model.  
 
5. Discussion 
The results of these analyses allow us to address three research questions:  
(i) Is the presence (or birth of a child) and age of children in a household associated with the 
propensity to move?  
Our empirical investigation using the ten waves of HILDA panel survey provides empirical 
support that the presence of older children in Australian couple households is negatively 
associated with a residential move i.e. couple households are less likely to move if they have 
older children in the family. Birth and pregnancy are negatively associated with the 
propensity to move for singles, however, for couples a pregnancy or birth is significantly 
positively associated with the likelihood of moving residence. 
(ii) When is the presence (or birth of a child) in a household more likely to be associated 
with the propensity to move to an advantaged or disadvantaged neighbourhood? 
The results presented in this study show that pregnancy and birth is negatively associated 
with the probability of moving to a non-disadvantaged neighbourhood, relative to not moving 
at all, among singles. However, couples expecting a new (first) child are more likely to move 
into non-disadvantaged neighbourhoods.  
The results also confirm the persistence of spatial polarisation (of disadvantage). In 
particular, relative to not moving, the risk of moving into a disadvantaged neighbourhood is 
almost two times greater than for households that are already living in a disadvantaged 
neighbourhood. This suggests that spatial polarisation of disadvantage in Australia is an issue 
that needs to be addressed. 
(iii)  Is it important to include the effects of household decision-making in a model for the 
propensity to move using individual level longitudinal data? 
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The multilevel models show that the standard errors of covariate effects may be 
underestimated if the decision to move at household level is not taken into account, leading to 
biased coefficients and inaccurate conclusions. In particular, the decision to move by an 
individual when they are single is likely to be differentially influenced by a partner when they 
are subsequently living in a couple household. The correlation between the unobserved 
random effects of singles and couples ranges from 0.3 to 0.6 across the models.  
What do these results mean on a more substantive level? Statistics show that a significant 
number of Australians experience some forms of housing stress, for instance in 2010, 16% of 
the household population in the country paid more than 30% of their income in housing cost 
(Rowley and Ong 2012).  The finding in this study that pregnancy and birth are both 
negatively correlated with the propensity to move to a non-disadvantaged neighbourhood 
among single parents suggests that for specific population groups, advancing in one’s 
housing career is not an easy feat, particularly during childbearing years.  This partly explains 
why, despite the country’s advanced economic status, many Australians are still concerned 
about their capacity to provide a home conducive for raising children (Dockery, Ong, 
Colquhoun, Li and Kendall 2013). Considering that a number of studies have provided 
conclusive evidence which highlight the critical role of a home to the holistic development of 
a child (Dockery, et al. 2013, Taylor and Edwards 2012; Harker 2006), it is important for 
socio-economic planners to ensure that single parents, along other socio-economically 
vulnerable groups, are well-targeted by existing housing assistance programs.  Furthermore, 
the results pointing to spatial polarization of disadvantage highlights the need for socio-
economic planners to evaluate the effectiveness of housing assistance policies that are already 
in place and to explore for more economical yet high-quality housing options, especially for 
those who belong in the lower echelons of the society. Overall, to arrest proliferation of 
socio-economic disadvantage, residential mobility should be used as a channel to improve 
one’s housing career, especially for households with children.  
 
6. Conclusion 
Life events precipitate residential change, as they entail new housing needs. For example, our 
model results show a concave relationship between age and mobility propensities. Compared 
to middle aged-individuals, both younger and older individuals are more likely to move 
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residence. This may be partly attributed to young adults leaving the parental home while 
older adults adjust their housing situation as they enter retirement age.   
We contribute to the gap in the literature of residential mobility in Australia in several ways. 
First, we advance the literature of residential mobility in Australia by briefly examining the 
interrelationship between fertility, mobility propensities and neighbourhood quality 
adjustments. Here, we find mixed results. In particular, it appears that having older children 
in Australia is negatively associated with a higher propensity to move among couples, while 
birth and pregnancy are negatively associated with the propensity to move among singles, but 
positively associated with the propensity of a couple to move. Throughout the discussion, we 
have treated the decision to move residence as an intra-household decision-making process 
by estimating models that allowed an individual’s unobserved propensity to move residence 
(that is unaccounted by the observable covariates) to depend on another household members’ 
unobserved effect.  
The approach taken here is not without limitations. For instance, in this study, we excluded 
residential moves due to union formation/dissolution and we treated the fertility-related 
variables as exogenous.  Further research is warranted to be able to capture changes in 
household composition (e.g., union formation/dissolution), fertility (e.g., pregnancy/birth) 
and residential mobility as a multi-process outcome. Future studies may also consider 
estimating nested logistic models. In the nested logistic model, the propensity to relocate is 
first modeled. Conditional on moving, one can then classify whether the move represents an 
improvement (or not) relative to the quality of neighbourhood where the household is 
currently living. In addition, a discrete-time hazard model may also be estimated to analyze 
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7. Tables and figures 
Table 1: Characteristics of Singles and Couples who Did Not Move (percentages) 
D ND D ND
Same Same Same Same Same Up Down Same Same Up Down Same
Sex (%)
     Female 52.3 49.8 51.7 54.0 51.1 48.7
     Male 47.7 50.2 48.3 46.0 48.9 51.4
College education (%)
No college degree 90.4 77.3 84.3 62.6 92.7 86.5 88.3 74.2 88.7 81.1 77.1 55.8
Only one has college 
degree
9.7 22.7 11.9 23.5 7.3 13.5 11.7 25.8 10.0 11.6 18.0 25.6
Both have college 
degree
3.9 13.9 1.4 7.2 4.8 18.6
Employment status (%)
Not employed 46.1 30.0 31.4 16.7 46.8 33.5 31.7 20.8 31.8 19.1 19.7 7.7
Only one is employed 53.9 70.0 29.3 27.6 53.2 66.5 68.3 79.2 30.9 25.5 31.1 29.3
Both are employed 39.3 55.7 37.3 55.4 49.2 63.0
Government assistance 
(%)
     Did not receive 47.0 66.4 60.6 81.0 42.5 53.9 53.6 71.2 59.4 73.7 70.7 88.4
     Received 53.0 33.6 39.4 19.0 57.5 46.1 46.4 28.8 40.6 26.3 29.3 11.6
Tenure Status (%)
Owns house (incl. 
rent-free)
50.2 57.5 79.1 86.5 21.8 30.4 27.7 27.5 38.7 49.7 44.4 46.2
Renting 49.9 42.5 20.9 13.5 78.2 69.6 72.3 72.6 61.3 50.3 55.6 53.8
Number of children 
less than 15 years old 
(%)
No child less than 15 
years old
86.7 90.0 62.1 60.7 76.0 82.4 83.2 89.9 50.5 54.5 56.5 54.4
Has one 6.6 5.8 13.3 15.3 11.5 9.2 8.7 5.9 18.5 16.5 14.0 19.2
Has two or more 6.8 4.3 24.6 24.0 12.5 8.5 8.1 4.3 31.1 29.0 29.4 26.4
Age of youngest child 
(%)
      No child 88.1 90.4 67.8 66.5 79.7 85.2 85.8 91.1 60.0 64.8 69.0 66.9
      < 5 years 4.0 2.4 12.0 12.7 9.7 7.0 5.8 3.5 17.5 18.7 17.8 19.1
      [5,10] years 4.9 4.2 12.8 13.1 7.8 5.6 5.7 3.5 15.8 12.6 10.2 10.2
      [11,14] years 3.1 3.1 7.4 7.7 2.9 2.3 2.7 2.0 6.8 3.9 3.0 3.8
Expecting child (%)
      Not expecting 96.7 98.0 93.4 92.5 93.9 95.7 95.6 97.7 86.4 84.3 87.4 82.5
      Pregnant 1.8 1.1 2.9 3.0 1.8 2.3 2.2 1.3 2.6 7.6 3.9 7.3
      First birth 1.0 0.6 1.1 1.6 1.1 1.2 0.8 0.5 2.6 3.1 3.7 3.8
      Higher order birth 0.6 0.3 2.6 2.9 3.3 0.8 1.4 0.5 8.4 5.0 5.0 6.4




ratio is < 1
16.8 16.2 33.5 26.8 27.3 24.5 17.7 14.4 47.1 38.2 36.5 34.3
[1, 2) 49.8 49.4 56.8 60.2 48.2 47.7 45.4 50.5 48.1 56.2 49.4 57.0
[2, 3) 15.0 15.2 9.6 12.6 10.4 13.7 17.0 16.1 4.7 5.6 13.8 8.6
>= 3 18.5 19.3 0.1 0.3 14.1 14.1 20.0 19.0 0.1 nil 0.3 0.2
Living in Major city 53.5 76.3 40.9 70.3 48.3 51.6 51.8 72.8 36.9 47.2 48.6 72.6
Inner Regional 
Australia
27.5 15.8 34.4 20.8 29.2 31.9 36.4 16.7 34.7 32.3 32.8 16.6
Outer Regional 
Australia
18.0 6.6 23.5 7.5 21.1 15.6 10.2 8.7 26.0 19.9 15.2 8.0
Remote Australia 1.0 1.3 1.2 1.5 1.5 1.0 1.6 1.8 2.5 0.7 3.4 2.8
Living in ACT nil 1.5 nil 2.2 nil 0.6 0.3 1.9 nil 0.2 0.4 2.3
NSW 29.8 36.7 28.1 32.0 28.9 27.1 26.8 33.6 28.3 30.2 33.8 32.1
VIC 23.1 25.4 16.7 27.4 16.0 22.9 19.7 23.4 8.4 17.6 10.5 22.7
QLD 23.2 16.6 27.1 18.3 28.9 29.7 28.5 22.7 37.1 34.3 33.3 24.0
SA 12.5 7.1 12.9 7.0 12.8 10.5 8.8 4.9 8.5 7.3 10.2 5.0
WA 6.0 10.3 7.3 11.0 5.3 4.4 11.5 10.1 5.9 6.2 7.1 11.7
TAS 5.3 1.4 7.9 1.3 8.1 4.7 3.1 1.5 11.9 3.9 3.8 1.2
NT nil 1.1 nil 0.8 nil 0.1 1.3 1.9 nil 0.2 0.9 1.0
Average home 
satisfaction
7.7 7.9 8.0 8.2 6.7 7.1 7.2 7.2 6.7 6.7 7.1 6.9
Average neighborhood 
satisfaction
7.3 7.8 7.7 8.1 6.9 6.9 7.5 7.6 6.9 6.9 7.6 7.5
Average household 
disposable income 
(equivalised) (in ten 
thousand AUD)
2.6 3.5 2.8 4.0 2.4 2.6 2.8 3.5 2.5 3.3 3.2 4.2
Variable
Singles Couples





Note: Numbers are expressed as column percentages. For example, we estimate that 52% of 
singles from disadvantaged neighbourhood who did not move are female.
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Table 2. Estimates of Covariate Effects from Logistic Models for 
Moves between time t and t+1 
Est. SE Est. SE Est. SE Est. SE Est. SE Est. SE
1 if House tenure at time t is 
renting
0.74 0.04 0.74 0.04 0.75 0.04 1.39 0.05 1.41 0.06 1.35 0.05
Number of rooms per family 
member is less than 1
[1, 2) -0.04 0.06 -0.04 0.06 -0.04 0.06 -0.23 0.06 -0.23 0.06 -0.23 0.06
[2, 3) 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.07 -0.03 0.09 -0.03 0.09 -0.03 0.09
>= 3 0.17 0.07 0.17 0.07 0.17 0.07 0.28 0.44 0.23 0.44 0.23 0.44
1 if Hhld head is Male -0.09 0.04 -0.10 0.04 -0.10 0.04 -0.07 0.24 -0.01 0.28 -0.05 0.21
Age (centered at 40) -0.03 0.00 -0.03 0.00 -0.03 0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.00
Age (centered at 40) squared 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1 if neither partner has at least 
college degree at time t
Only one partner has college 
degree
0.03 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.05
Both partners have college 
degree
0.08 0.05 0.09 0.05 0.09 0.05 0.12 0.07 0.13 0.07 0.12 0.07
1 if both are employed at time t 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.05
Neither one is employed 0.02 0.10 0.02 0.10 0.02 0.09
Only one partner is employed -0.04 0.05 -0.04 0.05 -0.04 0.05
1 if Married (vs. cohabiting) 0.09 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.11 0.06
Household disposable income 
(equivalised, in '0,000)
-0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01
Home satisfaction at time t -0.15 0.01 -0.15 0.01 -0.15 0.01 -0.23 0.01 -0.23 0.01 -0.22 0.01
Satisfaction on being part of 
local community at time t
-0.03 0.01 -0.03 0.01 -0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01
Neighborhood satisfaction at 
time t
0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 -0.06 0.01 -0.06 0.01 -0.06 0.01
1 if Major city
Inner Regional Australia 0.28 0.05 0.28 0.05 0.28 0.05 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.06
Outer Regional Australia 0.23 0.06 0.23 0.06 0.23 0.06 0.26 0.07 0.26 0.08 0.26 0.07
Remote Australia 0.24 0.13 0.24 0.13 0.24 0.13 0.37 0.14 0.36 0.14 0.35 0.14
1 if individual is living in ACT at 
time t
NSW 0.02 0.15 0.01 0.16 0.02 0.15 0.21 0.16 0.23 0.17 0.21 0.15
VIC -0.03 0.15 -0.04 0.16 -0.03 0.15 0.09 0.16 0.11 0.17 0.10 0.15
QLD 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.40 0.16 0.43 0.17 0.41 0.16
SA -0.16 0.15 -0.17 0.17 -0.16 0.16 -0.09 0.17 -0.08 0.18 -0.08 0.17
WA -0.01 0.15 -0.02 0.17 -0.01 0.16 0.22 0.17 0.24 0.18 0.22 0.16
TAS -0.08 0.18 -0.09 0.19 -0.07 0.18 0.23 0.20 0.24 0.21 0.22 0.20
NT 0.45 0.23 0.44 0.24 0.45 0.24 0.07 0.29 0.09 0.30 0.09 0.28
1 if number of children less than 
15 years old at time t is 0
 has  one child less than 15 
years old
0.02 0.16 0.01 0.16 0.03 0.16 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09
 has two or more children less 
than 15 years old
-0.09 0.16 -0.10 0.16 -0.09 0.16 -0.12 0.09 -0.13 0.09 -0.12 0.09
1 if no child (or number of 
children less than 15 years old) 
at time t is 0
age of youngest child is less 
than 5 years old
-0.03 0.16 -0.03 0.16 -0.04 0.16 -0.12 0.08 -0.12 0.08 -0.11 0.08
age of youngest child is [5,10] -0.22 0.17 -0.22 0.17 -0.24 0.17 -0.27 0.09 -0.28 0.09 -0.27 0.09
age of youngest child is [11,14] -0.18 0.19 -0.17 0.19 -0.19 0.19 -0.51 0.13 -0.52 0.13 -0.50 0.13
1 if no birth and no pregnancy 
between time t and t+1
there is pregnancy (but no birth) 
between time t and t+1
-0.45 0.14 -0.46 0.14 -0.46 0.14 0.14 0.09 0.13 0.09 0.13 0.09
there is (first) birth between time 
t and t+1
-0.65 0.21 -0.67 0.21 -0.66 0.21 0.29 0.12 0.29 0.12 0.29 0.12
there is (higher-order) birth 
between time t and t+1
-0.21 0.21 -0.22 0.21 -0.22 0.21 0.18 0.10 0.18 0.10 0.18 0.10
1 if received any form of 
assistance from government
0.14 0.05 0.14 0.05 0.14 0.05 -0.11 0.07 -0.10 0.08 -0.11 0.07
1 if living in a disadvantaged 
neighborhood














 Note: These models include duration effects. To save space, the results are shown in a 





Figure 1. Estimates of Duration Effects from Logistic Models for  
Moves between time t and t+1 
 
 
Note: The values correspond to estimated coefficients of the logistic models for the 
































































































Table 3. Estimates of Covariate Effects from Multinomial Logistic Models for  
Moves between time t and t+1  
Est. SE Est. SE Est. SE Est. SE Est. SE Est. SE Est. SE Est. SE
1 if House tenure at time t is 
renting
0.69 0.04 0.74 0.05 0.69 0.08 0.73 0.08 1.29 0.05 1.40 0.06 1.29 0.10 1.33 0.10
Number of rooms per family 
member is less than 1
[1, 2) 0.01 0.06 0.03 0.07 -0.20 0.09 -0.20 0.10 -0.20 0.06 -0.22 0.06 -0.31 0.12 -0.33 0.11
[2, 3) 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.08 -0.15 0.12 -0.13 0.13 -0.03 0.10 -0.05 0.10 0.08 0.19 0.06 0.18
>= 3 0.22 0.07 0.24 0.08 -0.01 0.11 0.00 0.12 0.17 0.48 0.03 0.53 0.62 0.79 0.36 0.87
1 if Hhld head is Male -0.11 0.04 -0.11 0.04 -0.07 0.07 -0.06 0.08 -0.10 0.23 -0.27 0.24 0.16 0.60 0.03 0.32
Age (centered at 40) -0.03 0.00 -0.03 0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.03 0.00
Age (centered at 40) squared 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1 if neither partner has at least 
college degree at time t
Only one partner has college 
degree
0.08 0.06 0.09 0.06 -0.31 0.13 -0.32 0.13
Both partners have college 
degree
0.16 0.05 0.18 0.05 -0.48 0.12 -0.50 0.12 0.20 0.07 0.22 0.07 -1.02 0.25 -1.06 0.26
1 if both are employed at time t 0.08 0.05 0.07 0.06 -0.09 0.08 -0.09 0.09
Neither one is employed -0.10 0.11 -0.11 0.11 0.21 0.16 0.20 0.16
Only one partner is employed -0.07 0.05 -0.08 0.06 0.05 0.11 0.05 0.11
1 if Married (vs. cohabiting) 0.14 0.06 0.11 0.06 0.05 0.11 0.05 0.10
Household disposable income 
(equivalised, in '0,000)
0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.05 0.02 -0.05 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.01 -0.09 0.02 -0.09 0.02
Home satisfaction at time t -0.14 0.01 -0.15 0.01 -0.13 0.02 -0.14 0.02 -0.22 0.01 -0.24 0.01 -0.19 0.02 -0.20 0.02
Satisfaction on being part of 
local community at time t
-0.03 0.01 -0.03 0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.02
Neighborhood satisfaction at 
time t
0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.06 0.01 -0.06 0.01 -0.03 0.03 -0.04 0.02
1 if Major city
Inner Regional Australia 0.18 0.05 0.19 0.05 0.57 0.08 0.62 0.08 0.00 0.06 -0.02 0.06 0.51 0.11 0.52 0.11
Outer Regional Australia 0.08 0.07 0.10 0.07 0.51 0.09 0.56 0.10 0.15 0.08 0.15 0.08 0.59 0.13 0.60 0.13
Remote Australia 0.23 0.13 0.26 0.14 0.22 0.23 0.21 0.25 0.17 0.14 0.20 0.15 0.95 0.24 0.94 0.26
1 if individual is living in ACT at 
time t
NSW -0.04 0.14 -0.07 0.13 1.61 0.72 2.18 0.31 0.13 0.15 0.09 0.13 1.29 0.72 1.40 0.51
VIC -0.06 0.14 -0.09 0.13 1.47 0.72 2.02 0.31 0.11 0.15 0.07 0.13 0.57 0.73 0.66 0.52
QLD 0.07 0.14 0.04 0.13 1.83 0.72 2.41 0.31 0.31 0.15 0.28 0.13 1.49 0.72 1.60 0.51
SA -0.36 0.15 -0.41 0.14 1.85 0.72 2.43 0.31 -0.24 0.17 -0.30 0.15 1.27 0.73 1.39 0.52
WA -0.09 0.15 -0.13 0.14 1.72 0.72 2.28 0.32 0.23 0.16 0.21 0.14 0.73 0.74 0.82 0.55
TAS -0.30 0.18 -0.36 0.18 1.84 0.73 2.39 0.33 -0.16 0.22 -0.22 0.21 1.59 0.74 1.71 0.54
NT 0.51 0.22 0.46 0.23 1.51 0.83 1.98 0.53 0.17 0.27 0.11 0.28 0.31 1.02 0.13 0.97
1 if number of children less than 
15 years old at time t is 0
 has  one child less than 15 
years old
-0.04 0.18 -0.04 0.20 0.17 0.22 0.14 0.22 0.12 0.09 0.10 0.10 -0.05 0.18 -0.05 0.18
 has two or more children less 
than 15 years old
-0.15 0.18 -0.15 0.19 -0.01 0.22 -0.02 0.23 -0.07 0.10 -0.10 0.10 -0.29 0.19 -0.30 0.19
1 if no child (or number of 
children less than 15 years old) 
at time t is 0
age of youngest child is less 
than 5 years old
-0.07 0.18 -0.07 0.19 0.08 0.22 0.11 0.22 -0.10 0.08 -0.13 0.09 -0.10 0.16 -0.11 0.17
age of youngest child is [5,10] -0.24 0.19 -0.25 0.21 -0.08 0.23 -0.07 0.24 -0.29 0.10 -0.30 0.10 -0.13 0.18 -0.14 0.19
age of youngest child is [11,14] -0.11 0.21 -0.14 0.23 -0.17 0.27 -0.20 0.27 -0.49 0.13 -0.52 0.14 -0.48 0.26 -0.51 0.27
1 if no birth and no pregnancy 
between time t and t+1
there is pregnancy (but no birth) 
between time t and t+1
-0.48 0.15 -0.51 0.16 -0.29 0.22 -0.30 0.22 0.17 0.09 0.19 0.10 -0.16 0.22 -0.18 0.22
there is (first) birth between time 
t and t+1
-0.77 0.24 -0.82 0.25 -0.27 0.32 -0.31 0.32 0.29 0.12 0.30 0.13 0.30 0.25 0.29 0.25
there is (higher-order) birth 
between time t and t+1
-0.44 0.26 -0.48 0.27 0.12 0.27 0.16 0.28 0.18 0.10 0.20 0.10 0.13 0.20 0.11 0.20
1 if received any form of 
assistance from government
0.08 0.05 0.08 0.05 0.26 0.08 0.29 0.08 -0.26 0.08 -0.26 0.09 0.21 0.13 0.22 0.13
1 if living in a disadvantaged 
neighborhood
























Note: These models include duration effects. To save space, the results are not shown but 





Table 4. Residual Variance for Logistic Models 
  
Simple Logistic HoH-joint MM-consensus 
Est. SE Est. SE Est. SE 
Residual 
variance 
            
Between-
individual 
    0.23     0.02 0.25 0.04 0.28 0.04 
Between-couple     0.16 0.06 0.14 0.02 
Single-couple 
covariance 
    0.29 0.05 0.14 0.02 
 
Note: The estimated coefficients and their standard errors correspond to the mean and 
standard deviation of the posterior distributions for the parameters derived from 50,000 
Markov chain Monte Carlo samples, after a burn-in of 10,000. 
 
 
Table 5.  Residual Variance for Multinomial Logistic Models 
HoH-joint 
Residual variance Est. SE Residual variance Est. SE 
Between-singleND 0.26 0.03 coupleD-singleD covariance 0.06 0.03 




Between-singleD 0.31 0.09 singleND-singleD covariance 0.11 0.05 










Note: The estimated coefficients and their standard errors correspond to the mean and 
standard deviation of the posterior distributions for the parameters derived from 5,000 
Markov chain Monte Carlo samples, after a burn-in of 500; D denotes disadvantaged while 

















Appendix Table 1. Profile of Final Sample 
# households used in the final 
sample 
11,748 
% of sampled individuals who 
were always single 
27.99% 
# individuals used in the final 
sample 
15,626 
% of sampled individuals who 
were always partnered 
53.12% 
% of individuals who 
remained in the sample for 
two consecutive waves only 
13.90% 
% of sampled individuals who 
were observed both single and 
with a partner 
18.89% 
% of individuals who 
remained in the sample for 
more than two consecutive 
waves (but not all waves) 
44.88% 
% of sampled individuals who 
did not move 
55.11% 
% of individuals who 
remained in the sample for all 
waves 
41.22% 
% of sampled individuals who 
moved residence once only 
24.04% 
% male 49.01% 
% of sampled individuals who 
moved residence twice 
11.51% 
% female 50.99% 
% of sampled individuals who 
moved residence thrice 
5.27% 
  
% of sampled  individuals who 





Appendix Table 2. Probability of Moving Residence between time t and t+1 
Singles (at time t) 17.83% 
Youngest child is less than 5 
years old (at time t) 
17.82% 
Couples (at time t) 11.92% 
Youngest child is between 5 
to 10 years old (at time t) 
11.37% 
Male  13.98% 
Youngest child is between 11 
to 14 years old (at time t) 
8.63% 
Female 17.75% 
No birth and pregnancy 
(between time t and t+1) 
14.55% 
No child less than 15 years old 
(at time t) 
15.23% 
There is pregnancy but no 
birth (between time t and 
t+1) 
21% 
With one child less than 15 
years old (at time t) 
15.56% 
There is first birth (between 
time t and t+1) 
24.40% 
With two or more children less 
than 15 years old (at time t) 
13.53% 
There is higher-order birth 
(between time t and t+1) 
22.04% 
 
